萨姆·佩尔兹曼
| 萨姆·佩尔兹曼 | |
|---|---|
| 出生 | 布鲁克林区  |
| 母校 | |
| 职业 | 大学教师、经济学家 |
| 雇主 | |
| 奖项 | 科睿唯安引文桂冠奖 |
萨姆·佩尔兹曼（Sam Peltzman），是芝加哥大学布斯商学院名誉教授。佩尔兹曼是《法律与经济学期刊》的编辑；1974年至1989年期间，亦担任《政治经济学杂志》的编辑。佩尔兹曼的研究重点是公部门和私部门之间的接口问题。
1960年，取得纽约城市学院工商管理学士；1965年，取得芝加哥大学经济学博士。
佩尔兹曼效应
[编辑]佩尔兹曼效应（英语：Peltzman effect），指企图增加安全性的规范反而增加风险，得名自佩尔兹曼。1975年，佩尔兹曼在《汽车安全规范的效果》（The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation）中提到“因为补偿非常完善，导致规范几乎没有减少高速公路上的死亡案例。”[1] 佩尔兹曼宣称规范最好没用，否则反而会引起反效果。[2][3] 佩尔兹曼效应也会导致一项重分配效果，即无辜者承担冒险者的风险，也就是道德风险。举例而言，对于安全带、碰撞区、防锁死系统等安全规范，一位能容忍高风险的驾驶会将车开得越快、越粗心，最终导致行人伤亡的增加。[4]
作品
[编辑]- "The Structure of the Money-Expenditures Relationship," American Economic Review, 1969.
- "The Effect of Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: The Case of Higher Education," Journal of Political Economy, 1973.
- "The Effects of Auto Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, 1975.
- The Regulation of Automobile Safety, American Enterprise Institute, 1976.
- "The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration," Journal of Law and Economics, 1977.
- "The Growth of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, 1980.
- "The Effect of FTC Advertising Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 1981.
- "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting," American Economic Review, 1985.
- "Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections," American Economic Review, 1987.
- "How Efficient is the Voting Market?" Journal of Law and Economics, 1990.
- "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992.
- Political Participation and Government Regulation, University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- "The Decline of Antitrust Enforcement," Review of Industrial Organization, 2001.
- "Mortality Inequality," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2009.
注脚
[编辑]- ^ Peltzman, Sam. The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation. Journal of Political Economy. 1975, 83 (4): 677–726. JSTOR 1830396. S2CID 153473566. doi:10.1086/260352.
- ^ Pope, Adam T.; Tollison, Robert D. "Rubbin' is racin": evidence of the Peltzman effect from NASCAR. Public Choice. 2010, 142 (3–4): 507–513. S2CID 153527032. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9548-2.
"The Peltzman (1975) effect predicts that when automobile safety regulations are made mandatory, at least some of their benefits will be offset by changes in the behavior of drivers
- ^ Hedlund, J. Risky business: safety regulations, risk compensation, and individual behavior. Injury Prevention. 2000, 6 (2): 82–89. PMC 1730605
. PMID 10875661. doi:10.1136/ip.6.2.82. This conclusion startled the road safety community and challenged the role of government in attempting to improve safety through regulation. In Peltzman's view, government regulation was useless and perhaps even counterproductive.
- ^ Diosdado-De-La-Pena, Maria-Paulina. Safety externalities of SUVs on passenger cars: An analysis of the Peltzman Effect using FARS data (学位论文). 2008 [2023-10-24]. （原始内容存档于2024-02-07）.
In general, safety regulation did decrease the probability of death for drivers, but this is offset by involving themselves in a riskier behavior, which reassigns the change of deaths from vehicle occupants to pedestrians
